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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERIEL M. HACKING, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Docket No. 16821 
v. 
RULON C. HACKING, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit for divorce by the Plaintiff-Respondent 
Meriel M. Hacking from her husband, Rulon c. Hacking, the 
Defendant-Appellant. (Respondent shall cite to pages in the 
record as follows: Trial transcript, "Tr--," and. Court file, 
"R--. II) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court's decision 
and Findings and an award for Respondent's attorneys fees 
incurred on appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After approximately 27 years of marriage, the Plaintiff-
Respondent Meriel M. Hacking was granted a divorce from the 
Defendant-Appellant Rulon C. Hacking (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to by his common nickname, "Jude Hacking") pursuant 
to a Partial Decree entered by the trial court on March 22, 
1979. (Partial 'Decree, R. 86) Findings of cruelty were made 
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by the court supporting the Partial Decree. (Findings, R. 84) 
No appeal has been taken by Appellant from these Findings or 
that Decree. The trial court therein specifically reserved 
for trial at a later date the issues of division of the 
property, permanent alimony and support and attorneys fees. 
Thereafter, following a two-day trial on the issues 
~eserved, the Honorable George E. Ballif filed his Memorandum 
Decision on September 4, 1979. (R. 92) Judgment and Findings 
were entered thereon on September 20, 1979. (R. 96-112) 
Following Appellant's Motion to Amend, the court entered 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended 
Judgment on October 10, 1979. (R. 135, 146) Except for 
certain specific items, the court awarded the marital property 
equally as tenants in common to both parties, subject to the 
outstanding obligations. (R. 147) Respondent was awarded the 
home furnishings while Appellant was awarded all interest in 
the Ouray Brine Company which was organized by Appellant with 
his eldest son. (R. 136, 146; Tr. 162-71) 
Among the properties divided equally between the parties 
included the family ranch and livestock operation, the home 
and a hamburger drive-in. The Appellant appeals,from this 
portion of the court's decision. Contrary to Appellant's 
suggestion (Appellant's Brief, p. 1), the trial court did not 
purport to divide or adjudicate property interests owned by 
the Appellant's mother, Vera Hacking. (Tr. 275-76) 
The court awarded to Respondent alimony until December, 
1980, and child support for the minor diabetic child. (R. 149) 
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However, Respondent was required to pay her own costs and 
attorneys fees. (R. 149) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent takes issue with Appellant's statements of 
fact as being incomplete and interspersed with Appellant's 
conclusions and opinions in an attempt to reargue the evidence. 
Appellant states only those facts favorable to his contentions 
to the exclusion of evidence supporting the Findings and 
Judgment of the trial court. Therefore, Respondent provides 
the following statements of facts and corrections of 
Appellant's statements: 
The parties were married in December, 1950, live in 
Vernal, Utah, and, during their marriage, acquired substantial 
property. (Tr. 27; R. 214) Five children were born during 
the marriage: Mitchell (Mitch) (1952), Susan (1953, Rodney 
{1955), Shara (1960) and Sonya (1967). (Complaint, R. 1) 
Except for Mitch, the children still reside with Respondent. 
(Findings, R. 84) 
At the time of the marriage, Appellant's father, Rulon 
s. Hacking, had purchased and was still buying ranch land upon 
which approximately $9,000.00 was owing on the purchase loan. 
{Tr. 28-29) At some time, Appellant and his father agreed 
that if Jude would stay and run the ranch that after the loans 
were paid off, the parties would receive part ownership of the 
ranch and some day it would all belong to them. (Tr. 47-48, 
227, 276-7) This "partnership" agreement was explained to and 
discussed between Appellant and Respondent over the years. 
3 
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(Tr. 276-7) 
Accordingly, in 1968 Appellant's parents, Rulon S. and 
Vera, conveyed to Appellant an undivided one-half interest in 
a portion of the ranch property known as the "Diamond Mountain 
property." (Exh. 4) Appellant still claims that pursuant to 
that "agreement," he is entitled to receive the remaining one-
half interest for his services in operating the ranch after 
his marriage to Respondent. (Tr. 48-50) 
In 1957, during the early period of the marriage, 
Appellant and his father purchased, as tenants in common, from 
Appellant's uncle an additional 1,057 acres of ranch property 
on Diamond Mountain. (Exh. 3; Tr. 342) Respondent also signed 
the note for its purchase. (Tr. 308) In connection with the 
ranch operation, Appellant and his father also acquired various 
government grazing permits and leases. (Tr. 342; Exh. 4) 
Later, the parties purchased a 5% interest in the Uintah Basin 
Grazing Association, 108 acres of land in Coal Mine Basin; and 
Appellant purchased stock in Hiko Bell (60,000 shares) and 
Dinah Bowl. Title to these assets are in Appellant's name. 
(Tr. 51, 68) The parties also purchased 54 acres known as the 
Allen place, the Maeser home where the parties resided and a 
hamburger drive-in. Title to these properties is in joint 
tenancy. {Tr. 68-69) 
From 1950 to 1969, Mr. Hacking was employed full-time by 
McCullough Tool Company. (Tr. 29) Respondent was employed in 
several jobs in the Vernal area, except for periods during the 
birth of two children in 1952 and 1953. Following each birth, 
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Respondent returned to work with the encouragement of her 
husband. (Tr. 214-15) In 1962 Respondent began employment in 
a government office. Respondent continued with this job until 
the birth in 1967 of their diabetic daughter, Sonya. Contrary 
to the claims in Appellant's Brief, the evidence was undisputed 
that all of Respondent's income was put in the parties' joint 
bank account and went "to pay off the home and help support 
the family." (Tr. 215) 
In about 1963, Appellant purchased a one-half interest in 
an A&W hamburger drive-in. (Tr. 216) Although the drive-in 
was initially managed by its co-owner, Mr. Merkley, Respondent 
was called in "a lot" to help in the drive-in in addition to 
her full-time employment and family duties. (Tr. 216) In 
1969, Appellant quit McCullough Tool Company and the parties 
acquired the other one-half interest in the drive-in, title to 
the property being taken in the names of both Appellant and 
Respondent. Since 1970, Mrs. Hacking has managed the drive-in 
on a full-time basis to produce income to support the Hacking 
family and the ranch. (Tr. 217, 227, 299, 342) Respondent 
often worked at nights while also taking care of Sonya, whose 
diabetic condition often required constant care. (Tr. 227-9) 
The rest of the family, including Appellant, also assisted in 
the operation of the drive-in as well as the ranch. (Tr. 156, 
345-6) 
The statement in Appellant's Brief that the "unwillingness 
of Respondent to continue to operate the drive-in business led 
the trial court to conclude" it should be sold is a self-serving 
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and misleading conclusion by Appellant which ignores his 
assertion that he didn't want to operate the drive-in either. 
{Appellant's Brief, p. 4; Tr. 341) Mrs. Hacking did testify 
of numerous specific factors (e.g., more modern competition, 
obsolescence, fuel shortages and road construction) indicating 
the declining value of the drive-in as an investment and a 
source of income. (Tr. 221-4, 226-7, 289-92, 341) The yearly 
net income from the drive-in has steadily declined from 
$33,134.00 in 1975 to $1,624.00 in 1978. (Exh. 22; Tr. 316-19) 
The Ranch Operation 
In addition to their separate employment and the operation 
of the A&W drive-in, Appellant and Respondent and the children 
all worked together in the family ranching operation. {Tr. 
32-3, 153-6, 161, 226, 269-70, 310) From about 1970 until 
1978 when Appellant set up the Ouray Brine Company, Appellant 
generally supervised the ranch. (Tr. 155-165) Respondent and 
the children have also worked hard to make the ranch.successful. 
(Tr. 360-1) Contrary to his claim that the ranch's expansion 
is to his credit, Appellant admitted that the drive-in money 
was "plowed in" to the ranch over the years, thereby, 
presumably, helping to make expansion possible. (Tr. 35) And, 
during this period, Respondent's efforts supported the family. 
(Tr. 34, 215, 217-8, 341-2) 
Although Appellant's "facts" attempt to minimize as 
"occasional" the participation in the ranch by Respondent and 
the children and to ignore their substantial contributions, 
the record contains more than sufficient evidence to support 
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the trial court's finding that "the parties have worked 
together in acquiring various assets . . • as a family enter-
prise. . " (R. 135, Finding #1; Tr. 32, 35, 153-7, 197, 
217, 219, 225-26, 270, 299, 308-12, 361) 
In addition to providing funds for the ranch's operation 
and expansion, Respondent signed notes and has been personally 
liable for the yearly ranch loans from the PCA and on the 
purchase money note for the purchase of part of the "Diamond 
Mountain property." (Tr. 35, 83, 91-2, 308-12, 216) 
Respondent and the children always participated in cattle 
drives such as from Diamond Mountain to the Coal Mine Basin, 
often walking on foot. (Tr. 219) Respondent has fed and cared 
for the horses used on the ranch and helped with regular 
ranching and cattle chores. (Tr. 270) On occasions Mr. Hacking 
has referred to the ranch and cattle as being Mrs. Hacking's. 
(Tr. 277-78) Although the children worked hard on the ranch 
and earned wages which were reported as income on their tax 
returns (as much as $9,000.00 in 1973), the money was not paid 
to them but was left in the ranch to be otherwise used in 
building up its operating capital. (Tr. 360). These specific 
examples are uncontroverted but are completely ignored in 
Appellant's Statement of Facts. 
Since February, 1978, the ranch has been managed by the 
eldest son, Mitch, who is responsible for its day-to-day 
operations. (Tr. 58, 156, 270) While, naturally, the parties 
are not always in agreement, even since their separation 
Respondent has worked satisfactorily with Appellant and their 
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son in cooperating in the financial and business affairs of 
the ranch. (Tr. 225, 270-1, 166, 192, 306) The other adult 
children, although pursuing their education and other interests, 
still are involved in helping at the ranch and the drive-in. 
(Tr. 157-58, 197, 218, 226, 270) 
The "substantial evidence" upon which Appellant relies to 
claim that he is "the most capable to operate the ranch," that 
Respondent is incapable or that the operation cannot be divided 
are merely his self-serving opinions. (Tr. 334, 339) The 
"substantial" testimony is to the contrary. 
Much of the ranch properties, including Diamond Mountain, 
were previously owned by various members of the Rulon S. 
Hacking family (Appellant's father). The fences from previous 
family divisions of the same property are still there and can 
be used again to divide the property, if necessary. (Tr. 
207-212, 304-305) Grazing lands and permits, as well as the 
livestock and land, can be physically separated or operated 
together. (Tr. 281-2, 186-7) They have so operated in the 
past. {Tr. 188) The farm machinery, which at trial Appellant 
opined was "junk," is operable and can be physically divided. 
{Tr. 70, 294, 181-2, 294) Whatever physical labor and equip-
ment may be needed to help Respondent is available from 
Respondent's family. (Tr. 204-8, 210-11, 286) In fact, 
Respondent's brother, Bill Murray, has helped the Hackings 
harvest corn in the past. (Tr. 204) 
The Ouray Brine Company 
Not surprisingly, Appellant's Brief does not mention the 
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Ouray Brine Company, a business enterprise which Appellant has 
developed since 1978 and which the court awarded separately to 
him. (Findings 2, 3: Tr. 136, 147) 
In February, 1978, Appellant left his full-time management 
of the ranching operations and that responsibility was delegated 
to Mitch with "no strings attached." (Tr. 156, 201, 332) 
Appellant took employment as a "shop hand" for Delgarno 
Transportation with a gross income of $18,000.00 a year. 
(Ans. to Int. R. 33-34: Tr. 55-6) 
In June, 1978, Appellant formed the Ouray Brine Company, 
a business, since operated by Appellant, to haul brine and oil 
to and from the nearby oil fields. (Tr. 56-7, 61-3) 
Appellant claimed that although he was operating the brine 
company, legal title thereto was in Mitch. (Tr. 339-40, 167) 
However, there was contradicting evidence that it was 
Appellant's idea for the business: and Appellant wanted Mitch 
involved to keep the business out of the divorce. (Tr. 59, 
165, 173) Appellant has made all the contacts with customers. 
(Tr. 347-8, 168). Mitch Hacking's involvement is to supply 
his signature when required. (Tr. 169-70, 172, 174) The 
business records are kept by Appellant and are in his 
possession. (Tr. 59-60, 170-1) Appellant has hired as a 
"bookkeeper" and pays a salary to Marilyn Caldwell, who was 
referred to as Appellant's girlfriend. (Tr. 169, 171) 
Appellant personally guaranteed the purchase of equipment, 
i~cluding a truck purchased from proceeds of the sale of ranch 
cattle. (Tr. 61, 76, 176-79) The business was not registered 
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with the Secretary of State. (Tr. 65) 
The trial court found that although evidence showed the 
legal title to belong to Mitch, "an exchange of jobs between 
the Defendant and Mitchell appears to be for convenience and 
appearances only and does not affect the true equitable owner-
ship of the business." (Finding #2, Tr. 136) Nevertheless, 
because the business was developed when the parties were 
separated, the court awarded the entire property to Appellant 
as his separate"property. (Finding #3, ibid.) Although 
Respondent has not cross appealed from the trial court's 
finding to award this business to Appellant, Respondent does 
point to the fact that (1) Appellant received more than one-
half of the total assets of the parties; and (2) Appellant was 
awarded a going business which presently occupies nearly all 
of his time and attention. 
10 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
It is apparent that the object of Appellant's Brief is 
to reargue the weight of the evidence. Appellant asks this 
Court to accept his testimony, resolve all the disputed issues 
and facts in his favor where there is a conflict in the 
evidence and ignore the substantial evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings and decision. 
Appellant gives lip service to, but completely disregards, 
the rule of law that the trial court's findings are endowed 
with a presumption of validity and will not be disturbed 
because an appellant views the facts differently. Searle v. 
Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974) J Stone v. Stone, 19 U.2d 378, 
431 P.2d 802 (1967). On appeal this Court will review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to support the findings 
of the trial court. Cook v. Gardner, 14 U.2d 193, 381 P.2d 
78 (1963). 
The trial court is in an advantaged position in factual 
matters, particularly in dividing the assets of a marriage. 
Considerable deference is given to the findings and judgment 
of that court. It is the prerogative of the trial judge to 
judge the creditability of witnesses, observe their demeanor 
and conduct in testifying and give to the testimony such weight 
as the trier of fact deems it is entitled. If there should be 
conflict in the evidence, the Supreme Court assumes that the 
11 
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trial court believed the evidence supporting the findings. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, #16407, July 18, 1980 (Utah); Stone v. 
Stone, supra; Child v. Child, 8 U.2d 261, 267, 332 P.2d 981 
(1958). 
The burden is on the Appellant to show error. Mitchell 
v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah, 1974); Stone v. Stone, supra. 
--
The question on appeal is not what the trial court could have 
done but were the findings supported by the evidence. As 
particularly set forth and cited in Respondent's Statement of 
Facts (and throughout this Brief) , the Findings and Judgment 
were amply and substantially supported by the evidence. 
Appellant cannot reargue the weight of the evidence by selected 
testimony and opinion which do not comport to all the facts. 
Failing to prevail in the lower court, Appellant may not recite 
his evidence favorable to his contentions to the exclusion of 
evidence supporting the lower court's findings. Thompson v. 
Condas, 27 U.2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). 
Appellant complains that the Findings of the court did 
not "recite specific findings to justify its general conclusion 
." or specifically find that Appellant's proposed distribu-
tion of assets was unjust. (Appellant's Brief, p. 14) This 
is merely an assertion without substance. A finding that the 
parties worked together in acquiring and developing a family 
enterprise adequately supports the court's ultimate conclusion 
that the parties should each receive a one-half interest there-
in. A trial court need not make specific "negative" findings. 
(Findings, #1; R. 135-6) Findings should be limited to the 
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ultimate facts. If they ascertain ultimate facts and conform 
to the pleadings and supporting evidence, they are regarded 
as sufficient. They will support the judgment, though they 
are "very general." Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 
(Utah, 19 7 7 ) . 
Respondent submits that Appellant's Brief does not show 
any abuse of discretion by the trial court. That court has 
wide discretion to divide the properties in a manner fair and 
equitable for the protection and welfare of both parties. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, supra, and cases cited therein; Slaughter 
v. Slaughter, 18 U.2d 274, 421 P.2d 503 (1966). The decision 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
13 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
THE MARITAL PROPERTY EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS 
TENANTS IN COMMON. 
As previously noted, the lower court awarded Appellant 
his interest in the brine company, which business Appellant 
operates full-time. The household furnishings were awarded 
to Respondent. The remaining properties were divided equally 
between the parties, each party to receive a one-half interest 
in common. 
Appellant's sole contention is that the court abused its 
discretion when it did not award him the ranch properties and 
equipment outright. Appellant seems to be of the opinion that 
the court was obliged to accept whatever Appellant asserted 
was "fair and equitable" to him to the exclusion of any other 
considerations. However, the court has the discretion to 
divide the marriage property in a fair and equitable manner 
for the protection of both parties. After due consideration 
to all the evidence and various factors, it was not an abuse 
for the court to refuse to divide the properties in a manner 
Appellant believed most beneficial to him. (R. 92, 95) 
Lowery v. Lowery, #16170, (Utah, filed Dec. 4, 1979). 
At the trial court's request, each party proposed to the 
court a division of the assets. (R. 12-16, 17-24, 272-95) 
Respondent's proposed division is Exhibit 20. Appellant's 
proposal is Exhibit 1. In arriving at its decision, the trial 
court did not completely accept the proposal of either party, 
obviously giving consideration to the interests and equities 
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of each. The court was entitled to compare and evaluate the 
evidence regarding the following factors: 
1. Respondent's contributions to and sacrifices in the 
marriage and in acquiring and developing the ranch and other 
assets. (Tr. 32, 34-5, 83, 91-2, 155, 213-20, 227-29, 270-77, 
308, 312, 342, 360-1) 
2. The physical and mental health of the parties. (Tr. 
265-8, 337-8, 345) 
3. The relative education, training and ability of the 
parties. (Tr. 34, 165, 168-79, 190, 193, 204-211, 215, 217, 
221-24, 299, 341) 
4. The duration of the marriage: 28 years and the age of 
the parties (approximately 45 years). (R. l; Tr. 213) 
5. The present income of the parties and the property 
acquired and owned either jointly or by each one, including 
Appellant's interest in the brine company and the present value 
of the drive-in. (Tr. 127, 291-2, 319) 
6. The definite expectancy of Appellant in his mother's 
estate as a future contingency. (Tr. 48-9) 
7. Their obligations to and needs of the children, all 
of whom, except for Mitch, reside with Respondent (Findings, 
R. 84), particularly the needs of Sonya. (Tr. 227-29; Exhs. 
17, 18) Harding v. Harding, 26 U.2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971); 
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 581-2, 236 P.2d 1066 
(1951); Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U.2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956). This 
Court has also stated that consideration may also be given to 
the "relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties to their 
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marriage vows and their relative guilt or innocence in causing 
the breakup of the marriage." Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, 
699 (Utah, 1974); Wilson v. Wilson, supra, at p. 82. (Findings, 
R. 84) There is no abuse of discretion when the trial court 
has given "conscientious and judicious consideration" to these 
various factors. Slaughter v. Slaughter, supra. In spite of 
the overwhelming evidence, cited herein, which supports the 
court's decision, Appellant still argues that his testimony 
was "substantial." 
It is interesting to note that in the lower court, 
Appellant admitted that his wife was entitled to one-half the 
assets of the family operation. (Tr. 355-56, 375) Even 
Appellant's counsel agreed that the court's suggestion of 
dividing property equally was a "possible" alternative and 
further conceded that "there are dozens of ways" in which the 
property can be split up. The question, counsel stated, is 
to pick "the very best." (Tr. 376) Appellant claimed his 
proposal was "the very best," which it no doubt was for his 
own interests. If Appellant's proposal of an "equal" division 
of property is fair and equitable to both parties, then 
Appellant should be willing to take the "equal" portion he 
allocated to Respondent and let Respondent have that portion 
which Appellant allocated himself on Exhibit 1. (Tr. 272} 
Yet, Appellant refused. (Tr. 355-57) 
Also, Appellant says he does not now dispute the award 
to him of one-half of the A&W drive-in. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 4-5} Apparentl1j he claims that an "equal" division requires 
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he also receive all the ranch properties and assets, as well as 
his present brine company business. a11d one-half of the drive-in. 
Obviously, Appellant agrees with Respondent's testimony 
that the "Diamond Mountain" ranch property is the "cream" of 
the ranch property with recreation, hunting, fishing opportunities. 
(Tr. 278-9) The self-interests of Appellant are even more 
apparent considering the substantial differences between the 
parties as to the values of such assets as the cattle and the 
drive-in. (Exhs. 1, 20, 9) It is patently ridiculous to argue 
that to give the Diamond Mountain property to Appellant and a 
declining asset (the drive-in) to Respondent is "equal" or "fair." 
Respondent submits that the trial court acted clearly with-
in its discretion in dividing equally the interests in the 
ranch and other assets as tenants in common. This Court has 
heretofore affirmed a decision of this trial court in dividing 
marriage property equally, including ranch properties. Searle 
v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974). Also see Naylor v. Naylor, 
563 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1977); English v. English, 565 P.2d (Utah, 
1977); Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1979); Kerr v. 
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah, 1980); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 
491 (Utah, 1975). In each of these cases (and others cited by 
Appellant as authority for his ·assertion that the lower court 
abused its discretion), this Court affirmed the trial court's 
exercise of that discretion. See, also, Pope v. Pope, 589 
P.2d 752 (1978). 
In Searle, the trial court found that the property in the 
names of either or both of the par tie's was accumulated "as a 
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result of the joint efforts of the parties. " The 
testimony of each side as to properties and their values was 
"contradictory and ambiguous." The court divided the ranch 
property equally, giving the husband an option to purchase the 
wife's portion. (522 P.2d, at 698-9) The husband was also 
awarded a separate business. The husband argued, just as 
Appellant argues here, that his wife was not entitled to one-
half of the assets accumulated during the marriage and that an 
equitable distribution would be to award him "all of the 
businesses and the ranching property .... " (522 P.2d, at 
699) This Court held that the Honorable Judge Ballif had not 
abused the "broad discretion reposed in him." (522 P.2d, at 
700) There is no material distinction between Searle and the 
Findings and Judgment of Judge Ballif here. 
In English v. English, supra, at 565-66, this Court 
affirmed the trial court's decision to divide commercial 
property between the husband and wife as tenants in common, 
subject to the outstanding debts. 
In the instant case, as a tenant in common, Appellant may 
seek a partition as provided by law if he determines he cannot 
get along with Respondent in the operation of the ranch. He 
is not "forced into a partnership." (Judgment, R. 149) There 
is no abuse of discretion in making the parties tenants in 
common of an on-going business or of business property. 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 600 P.2d 1183 (Mont., 1979); Propper v. 
Propper, 221 N.W.2d 566 (Minn., 1974); Lee v. Lee, 78 Ill. 
App. 3d 1123, 398 N.E.2d 126, 132-34 (1979); Nelson v. Nelson, 
18 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
590 S.W.2d 293 (Ark., 1980); In the Matter of the Marriage of 
Trujillo, 580 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App., 1979); Levin v. Levin, 
43 Md. App. 380, 405 A.2d 770, 775-77 (1979); Smith v. Smith, 
535 P.2d 1109 (Ha., 1975). An Illinois Appellate Court held 
it was error not to award the wife a joint interest in the 
husband's grain elevator business to which she had made 
contribution of funds and labor. Leone v. Leone, 39 Ill. App. 
3d 547, 350 N.E.2d 545 (1976). 
Appellant argues that Respondent arbitrarily refuses to 
cooperate with Appellant in operating the ranch and that their 
son, Mitch, must referee and resolve their differences. He 
also asserts that there is no evidence to "suggest" that the 
parties can work together, "even under LMitch'~7 benevolent 
stewardship." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-7) Again, Appellant 
entirely ignores the evidence supporting the trial court and 
selects certain portions out of context. (E.g., Tr. 186-88, 
198-201) 
While there are differences, Mrs. Hacking and the children 
continue to make significant contributions to a cooperative 
and efficient management of the ranch. They have "a good 
working relationship" satisfactory to Respondent and to 
Mitchell. (Tr. 157, 161, 166, 193, 199, 269-72) Respondent 
desires to keep the ranch intact and operating. (Tr. 279, 304, 
306) If their interests are together, there is not much 
trouble. (Tr. 207) In fact, the ranch has so operated since 
1978. (Tr. 186-88) 
If Appellant believes the ranch cannot be operated in 
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cooperation, it must be a result of his apparent unwillingness 
to do so. (Tr. 339, 77) If that be the case, he may seek for 
partition of the ranch. Contrary to Appellant's claims, the 
interests of the parties can be separated and divided. (Tr. 
187-88) Much of the equipment isn't presently used and can 
be divided. (Tr. 180-2) Cattle and grazing permits can be 
divided. (Tr. 186-7, 282) The Diamond Mountain property can 
be physically separated into parcels already divided by 
existing fences. (Tr. 206-12) Respondent has available the 
assistance and equipment to operate on her own, if necessary. 
(Tr. 204-210, 280, 305) While Appellant says there is 
substantial evidence to the contrary, the only such testimony was 
Appellant's own general denial. (Tr. 334) 
Also, contrary to Appellant's conclusions, the court did 
not force Mitchell into participating in the management. 
Mitch testified he was asked by his father to manage the ranch--
"no strings attached." (Tr. 200-1) Following his testimony 
that he would be willing to continue to operate the ranch, 
Mitch also agreed that: 
!_By Mr. Nielse~7 
Q If you were operating the ranch, it wouldn't present 
any problem to you, would it? 
A No. 
Q As a matter of fact, that is the way you have been 
operating with your 50 head of cattle mixed in with 
the families /sic7 operation for the last several 
years, isn't Tt?-
A Correct. 
20 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q You have been using part of the A.U.M.'s that don't 
belong to you? You have been using the feed from the 
Allen place, and so on, haven't you? 
A Correct. 
Q And that has not interferred with the management and 
operation of the ranch, has it? 
A No. 
(Tr. 188) 
Appellant quotes Mitchell's testimony out of context in 
efforts to accentuate, as fact, Appellant's opinions as to family 
conflict and bitterness. 
/_By Mr. Howar£!7 
Q Now, I know that you have a high regard for your 
mother and father, and I would have no doubt about 
that, and you don't either, do you? 
A No. 
Q And it's an unfortunate situation that you find 
yourself in? 
A I just don't know how they will feel about me when 
this is over. 
Q Well, I don't think they are going to feel badly 
toward you, either one of them. 
(Tr. 198) 
Appellant's specious attempt to equate a tenancy in common 
with a partnership is a mere smokescreen to cloud the obvious 
equities of the trial court's decision. A tenancy in common 
is not a "partnership." The court has not in any way imposed 
an involuntary partnership upon Appellant. As noted, if 
dissatisfied with common ownership of the ranch assets, 
Appellant may seek partition. But he cannot create the 
appearances that he is an unwilling "partner," handcuffed to 
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a former spouse. Such a position indicates a surprising 
ignorance of the relevant principles of law. Rocky Mountain 
Stud Farm v. Lunt, 46 Utah 299, 151 Pac. 521 (1951); Garner v. 
Anderson, 67 Utah 553, 248 Pac. 496 (1926); Bussell v. Barrz, 
61 Ida. 216, 102 P.2d 276 (1940); 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership, 
§11, pp. 936-7. Appellant does not cite any authority to 
support his claims here. 
The record herein, when considered in full, provides no 
support for any claim that there will inevitably be further 
unmanageable difficulties and distress between the parties. 
Nor was there any misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law by the trial court. DeRose v. DeRose, 19 U.2d 77, 426 
P.2d 221 (1967). The only case cited by Appellant wherein the 
lower court abused its discretion was Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 
871 (Utah, 1979) . In Read, this Court said it was inequitable 
to award 90% of the assets to the wife when the apparent 
purpose was to punish the defendant husband. 
In the instant matter, Respondent suggests that the 
apparent purpose of the Defendant-Appellant is to ignore the 
substantial contributions to and investment in the marriage 
by the Respondent now that it is time to distribute the 
dividends. Respondent has just as equal a right as Appellant 
has to reconstruct her life on a happy and useful basis. 
Gramme v. Gramme, supra, at 148. 
Since Point II of Appellant's argument (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 12) is merely repetitious of Point I, Respondent has not 
discussed that point separately. 
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Considering the record and facts of this case, the trial 
court did not abuse its broad discretion in dividing the 
property equally between the parties as tenants in common. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT 
FOR THE MINOR, DIABETIC CHILD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
In his Docketing Statement, Appellant takes issue with 
the portion of the trial court's decision awarding child 
support for the minor, diabetic child, Sonya, until she reaches 
21 years, unless otherwise ordered. (R. 149; Appellant's 
Docketing Statement, p. 3) Since Appellant did not discuss 
this point in his Brief, Respondent presumes he has abandoned 
the issue. See, also, Section 15-2-1, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
Respondent submits that she is entitled to an award of 
attorneys fees incurred in this appeal, particularly considering 
the appellate record herein and the lack of support in the trial 
court record for Appellant's appeal here. This Court may make 
such an award of attorneys fees to the wife for defending an 
appeal by the husband. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & 
Investment co., 3 U.2d 121, 123, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); 5 Am. Jur. 
2d, Appeal and Error, §1022. Or, this Court may remand to the 
trial court for such an award. Gramme v. Gramme, supra, per 
curiam; Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah, 1976). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion awarding the 
lssets equally between the parties as tenants in common. Its 
rudgment and Findings should be affirmed and Respondent should 
)e awarded her attorneys fees incurred herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ArthuC~--
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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